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C93, D81 1 Introduction
Loss aversion is believed to be one of the most robust phenomena of deci-
sion making under risk. Consequently, it represents a “core idea” (Kahneman
2003) of the leading alternative theoretical framework, the Cumulative Prospect
Theory or CPT (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Indeed, it has been observed
in numerous laboratory experiments.1 While this is very useful evidence, loss
aversion is essentially a matter of framing rather than any well-deﬁned pref-
erence, so the issue of external validity may be of special importance here.
Indeed, it may well be that in an unfamiliar, artiﬁcial situation created in the
laboratory, the experimenter is able to control subject’s perception and thus
induce diﬀerentiated behavior. In the ﬁeld, however, experienced decision
makers remaining in their natural environment may be less likely to divert
from whatever course of action represent their genuine best interest. Even if
many puzzling empirical ﬁndings, e.g. instances of labor supply decreasing
in response to a temporary hike in the wage rate, may be understood in
terms of loss aversion, this and most of other cases involve fairly complex
phenomena and alternative explanations are typically possible.
In view of this, carefully designed natural ﬁeld experiments seem to be an
attractive way to identify and possibly measure loss aversion. The current
study represents a new attempt in this respect. I make use of a unique oppor-
tunity to induce perception of a possible loss in a simple situation of decision
making under uncertainty. The ﬁndings can be summarized succinctly: no
evidence of loss aversion is observed and it seems to be diﬃcult to ascribe
this null result to any of the “usual suspects” – sample size, stakes, confusion,
boredom, ceiling eﬀect etc. In view of the predominantly positive ﬁndings
in previous studies, it is an intriguing result that calls for future research.
Together with some ﬁeld experiments and other studies that fail to ﬁnd the
hypothesized eﬀect, it may suggest that loss aversion is not as widespread as
it is commonly believed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the rel-
evant literature, section 3 describes the details of the design, section 4 –
predictions, section 5 shows the results while section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Most direct evidence on loss aversion comes from a number of laboratory ex-
periments such as, for example, (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz
1997) and more recently (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005, ?). Some studies,
1See, however, (Ert and Erev 2010).
1including (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan 2006) and (Tom, Fox,
Trepel, and Poldrack 2007) are beginning to investigate neural underpinning
of loss aversion. There are also several papers reporting observations from
the ﬁeld that might result from loss aversion, typically combined with other
factors. A prominent example is the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott 1985) associated with the “myopic loss aversion” by Benartzi and
Thaler (1995). Hardie, Johnson, and Fader (1993) and others using scanner
data ﬁnd that decreases on dimensions such as price and quality have greater
impact on the sales of consumer goods then identical increases. In another
often-cited study, Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) report
that NY cab drivers tend to drive less on good days – seemingly exhibiting
daily earnings targeting. Generally, the ﬁeld phenomena such as those dis-
cussed above are complex and cannot be taken as a proof of the hypothesis.
Trying to combine the merits of lab experiments and ﬁeld studies, ﬁeld
experiments may provide the most valuable evidence. Unfortunately, these
are scarce to date. Interestingly, the ﬁndings seem to be predominantly
negative; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstr¨ om (2006) do not ﬁnd any
evidence of loss aversion in their study of a high-stake TV show participants.
The same can be said of Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006). G¨ achter, Orzen,
Renner, and Starmer (2009) ﬁnd that framing of the diﬀerence between early
and late conference registration fee (as a discount or as a penalty) has some
impact on early registration rate but only in junior economists. As for this
study, it has to be emphasized that whether one registers early or not is
not a clear case of decision making under uncertainty (although not being
sure whether one would eventually attend the conference is surely one of the
important factors).
The same is generally true of studies such of persuasiveness of marketing
messages, reviewed by O Keefe and Jensen (2006). For example, Ganzach
and Karsahi (1995). These authors found that credit card holders’ reaction
to a letter informing of gains from the card usage was weaker than to a letter
describing equivalent losses from not using it.
The main methodological problem with ﬁeld experiments is that it is dif-
ﬁcult to identify situations in which a sizable population is involved in simple
decisions under risk with non-trivial stakes and potential losses that can be
actively manipulated by the researcher, observed and registered without the
participants’ knowledge (and thus consent). I have fortunately come across
such an opportunity. The only similar attempt that I was able to ﬁnd in
the literature is (Alejos, Paz, Mat´ ıas, and Javier 2005). The important di-
iﬀerences between the present study and the approach of Alejos et al. are
following: Firstly, I expclitly model the situation in terms of prospect theory.
Secondly, I have a sample which is three times larger. Thirdly and most im-
2portantly, Alejos, Paz, Mat´ ıas, and Javier (2005) run a within-subject design,
in which they divide their sample in three groups, that will all be subject to
three diﬀerent scoring rules at three diﬀerent points in time (thus the groups
would only diﬀer in terms of the order of being exposed to these rules). These
rules are announced at the beginning of the course. I, on the other hand,
run a one-time between-subject desing, refrain from informing the subjects
beforehand that rules will be diﬀerentiated thus preventing communication
regarding “optimal” risk-taking strategies.
The latter point may be crucial, given that Alejos, Paz, Mat´ ıas, and
Javier (2005) observe rather perplexing results. While comparison of their
“normalized reward” and “normalized penalty” conditions, which roughly
correspond to my treatments, yields no diﬀerence, the “penalty” condition
results in more risk taking than normalized reward in one case and less risk
taking in another. Furthermore, despite random treatment assignment, they
observe robust diﬀerences between groups’ behavior, even when controlling
for a number of covariates. The natural explanation is that intense within-
group communications took place, destroying independance of observations.
3 Design
The study was performed during two exams at the University of Warsaw -
a mid-term exam in Microeconomics at the Faculty of Economic Sciences
(henceforth: Micro) and a ﬁnal exam in Financial System of the Economy
at the Faculty of Management (FSE). The Micro exam involved some open-
ended questions and 10 multiple choice questions (with one correct and three
incorrect answers each). Unbeknownst to the students, exam instructions
came in two sorts, as far as the number of points per multiple choice question
was concerned: the Mixed Treatment (MT) and the Gain Treatment (GT),
see the ﬁrst rows of Table 1.
Table 1: Points awarded for closed-end questions
exam treatment correct missing incorrect
micro MT 2 0 -1
GT 3 1 0
FSE MT 1 0 -1
GT 2 1 0
First note that an incorrect answer would bring a penalty point in the MT
3only (so giving an answer yields a mixed prospect, hence the label). Second,
whatever answer was given to any question, a student would be awarded
one point more in the GT than in the MT. As a result, any combination of
answers would automatically bring 10 points more in the control than in the
loss condition. Accordingly, all grade thresholds were 10 points higher in the
former than in the latter.
What regards information provided to the students, before the exam they
had only been told that leaving a question unanswered would yield more
points than giving an incorrect answer. Assignment to exam rooms and
hence, to the two treatments was random. At the start of the exam the
students were given the accurate description of the scoring rules (including
grade thresholds) relevant for their treatment only (the translation of the
exam copies is available from the author).
The FSE exam proceeded in a similar fashion, with the following mod-
iﬁcations (some of which resulted from the fact that the author was not in
charge for the exam and thus had only limited Gain Treatment over the pro-
cedure). First, students had not been explicitly told the form of the exam in
advance but they could expect penalty points because these had been used
for the FSE exams in previous years. Second, grade thresholds were not
speciﬁed. Third, while assignment to treatments was, again, random, it was
not orthogonal to the mode of study (full-time, part-time or evening studies)
which tends to correlate i.a. with age, social background and skills; within
each mode of study the treatment assignment was randomized (though, ob-
viously, not necessarily with identical chances for either treatment). There
was thus was no selection on unobservables. Last but not least, the 10 closed
questions were of the yes/no type rather than a multiple choice one; the
points awarded are given in the last two rows of Table 1.
Both exams took place in the winter of 2009/2010. The Micro exam
involved nearly 100 students while FSE - about 400. The data collected
involved the gender of the student, the mode of study (which actually did
not vary among the Micro students), the number of points earned for the
open questions, the number of correct and incorrect answers and hence also
and most importantly, the number of missing answers.
4 Predictions
Choosing the best answer is obviously a task involving subject-speciﬁc skill
and knowledge. However, whether to actually choose it or rather leave the
question unanswered is a decision under uncertainty.
Crucially, for any level of certainty about one’s ability to pick the right
4answer, answering the question is a risky option, while giving no answer
guarantees a ﬁxed payoﬀ. Prospect theory proposes that a mixed prospect
(one involving possible losses) resulting from answering the question in the
loss treatment is generally relatively unattractive.
More precisely, if there is little curvature of the value function v(·) for
small stakes, as CPT predicts, we can assume that v(2) = 2,v(1) = 1,v(0) =
0,v(−1) = −λ, whereby λ > 1 is a loss aversion parameter. Let us denote
by p the probability of getting the answer right that makes an individual
indiﬀerent between guessing and skipping in the Gain Treatment. Under
standard prospect-theoretic notation of w+(·) as probability weighting func-






Assuming as in (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) that the probability weight-
ing function for gains is given as w+(p) = pγ/(pγ + (1 − p)γ)(1/γ) and for
median participant γ = 0.61 we obtain p = 0.645. We ask now whether a
subject would answer or skip a question with this level of certainty if she was





It is easy to verify that if the probability weighting function for losses is
w−(p) = pδ/(pδ + (1 − p)δ)(1/δ) with δ = 0.69 for a typical participant, then
moderate loss aversion of 1.4 would suﬃce to make this expression negative.
Thus she would abstain from taking the risk if she was in the MT and her
perceived probability of ﬁnding the correct answer was p. In other words,
higher level of certainty is required under MT, so a prediction of less questions
answered follows.
Similarly for the Micro exam we obtain w+(p) = 1/3, which gives p
close to .3 for a broad range of γ. Then the weight of the negative payoﬀ
in the MT for δ = .69 is close to .6, such that, again, very moderate loss
aversion parameter of 1.1 would be suﬃcient to prevent risk taking under
MT.2 We thus submit that CPT predicts less risk taking (i.e. more skipping
of questions) in the mixed treatment.
There are two important caveats to this prediction.
2The details of the calculation and sensitivity analysis are available from the author
upon request.
5The ﬁrst concerns broad vs. narrow framing: the reasoning presented
above implicitly assumed that students considered each question separately,
in isolation from the rest of the exam. However, students could combine
many similar decisions (“should I answer this question or not”) into a single
meta-prospect. Then, loss aversion (if any) could stop playing a role, e.g.
with 10 questions, each with an independent probability of a correct answer
of, say, .8, an aggregate loss is relatively unlikely. However, there are reasons
to believe that most subjects did not engage in such an aggregation. First,
combining several gambles would turn a series of relatively straightforward
decision problems (a choice between a sure thing and a two-outcome gamble)
into a much more complex one. Second, for most subjects there was probably
only a relatively narrow range of certainty for which the decision whether or
not to answer the question was a true dilemma. A typical subject could be
reasonably certain that she knew the answer to, say, eight questions (and thus
surely wanted to answer them), had absolutely no clue about one question
(and thus was not willing to gamble) and only had a real decision problem
for the one remaining question. This conjecture is corroborated by the fact
that, as the data shows, almost half of subjects eventually answered all the
questions or all but one question – perhaps for most of the other questions
they were reasonably sure about the correct answer (and indeed got most of
them right in the end).
The second important consideration is the fact that students may not be
interested in maximizing the number of points per se but rather in obtaining
a possibly high grade (or simply maximizing the probability of passing). This
could obviously aﬀect the risk posture. In a way, the same is true of monetary
rewards: the value of money is in the goods and services that it can buy. It
seems that in our case points could play the role of a “prime reinforcer” like we
generally believe money does in standard lab experiments. First, academic
programs used for the experiment are among the best in the country and
students are typically highly motivated. Clearly, scoring 17 points out of
40 is less unpleasant and humiliating than ending up with just 5, although
both would result in the same grade. In this sense, the grade is not all
that matters. Second, losing by a small margin only, students may generally
expect more leniency on the part of the lecturer (e.g. his or her willingness to
grant an additional chance to pass). Third, students did not know how well
they did with other questions and thus could not possibly guess whether they
are, say, below the threshold (and need to take a chance) or not.3 Again,
3I do elicit predictions of own exam score in a related project. The coeﬃcient of
correlation between actual and predicted score is only .477 and there is no tendency to
adjust risk posture to the predicted position (e.g. just below or just above the passing
6this consideration most probably has led them to think mostly in terms of
points. Even if all of the above did not apply, the loss framing could carry
over from points to grades.
To the extent therefore that students in diﬀerent treatments had sys-
tematically diﬀerent expectations regarding how their scores may compare
to grade thresholds, treatment eﬀects could result from rational calculation.
Obviously, this does not apply to the Micro exam, where students were ex-
plicitly told the thresholds, it could however to the FSE.
As for other eﬀects, a great many studies (see Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer
(1999)) show that males are generally more willing to take risk than females,
especially when its based on assessment on own ability. We therefore predict
less unanswered questions in male subjects.
5 Results
Table 2 shows summary statistics for both samples.
Table 2: Summary statistics for both samples
sample # obs. % in MT % male correct missing incorrect
micro 96 55 46 4.10 2.09 3.81
FSE 397 48 58 5.14 1.85 3.01
It is reassuring to note that the average number of missing answers was
non-trivial; in fact, about two-thirds of subjects omitted at least one question;
this leaves suﬃcient space for the treatment eﬀect (if any) to show.
Because of the numerous diﬀerences between the samples (outlined in
section 3), we report the results separately for the two, starting with the
Micro exam.
The simplest test of the treatment eﬀect is the comparison of number of
missing observations in the two treatments. While the number of missing
observations is slightly higher for the Mixed Treatment (2.21, as compared
to 1.95 for GT), the diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant (p = .16 in the M-W-W
test and p = .19 in the Fisher exact test).
Males tried to answer more questions than females (2.48 vs 1.63, p = .02
in M-W-W). This was not associated with any superior knowledge – scores
obtained (for either part of the exam) were nearly identical across genders.
threshold).
7This conﬁrms our auxiliary hypothesis of males being more self-assure and/or
more risk-seeking. There was no signiﬁcant interaction between gender and
treatment.
Results for the FSE sample were remarkably similar. While the mean is
slightly higher in the GT (1.98 vs 1.71), the diﬀerence is far from signiﬁcant
(p = .53 in the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test or p = .99 in the Fisher exact
test). However, as mentioned before, assignment to the treatments was not
orthogonal to the mode of study. Speciﬁcally, full-time students were mostly
assigned to the MT while part-time and evenings students more often to the
GT.
Table 3: FSE: number of missing answers depending on treatment and mode
of study (# of obs. in parentheses)
treatment full-time evening part-time
MT 1.65 1.44 2.59
(142) (31) (17)
GT 1.86 2.31 1.55
(57) (94) (56)
Table 3 shows that, ﬁrst, diﬀerences between the numbers of missing
observations between modes of study were limited (though scores were in
fact highly divergent, with full-time students performing much better than
the other two categories). Second, there was no clear pattern of treatment
eﬀect – while evening students left more questions unanswered in the GT,
the opposite was true for the part-times. These diﬀerences appear to stem
from the number of observations being limited in some cells; none of them is
signiﬁcant.
Further analysis showed that gender eﬀect was strong and highly signiﬁ-
cant – on average males tried to answer almost one question more (M-W-W
p = .001).
6 Conclusion
The current study was planned as a straightforward ﬁeld tests of loss aversion
in decision making in risk and uncertainty. With some 500 subjects motivated
to make best choices possible, hardly any trace of loss aversion was detected.
This null eﬀect cannot be ascribed to the speciﬁcity of the sample in the
sense that laboratory studies ﬁnding loss aversion used university students
8as well. Nor was it likely that subjects did not notice or understand the
scoring rules. Apparent lack of loss aversion could result from the fact that
the underlying reward medium involved academic success rather than money;
but to the extent that loss aversion goes away with experience, the all too
familiar monetary domain is the one where we would least expect it to show.
Besides, previous experiments on endowment eﬀect seem to suggest that
loss aversion works just ﬁne for coﬀee mugs, chocolate bars etc. where no
money is involved at all. Combining my results with those of some other
ﬁeld experiments mentioned before, loss aversion may not be as ubiquitous
in the ﬁeld as it would seem given the bulk of evidence from the laboratory.
Factors such as subjects’ experience could play a role and call for ad-
ditional observations but the similarity of the results obtained for the two
samples seem to suggest that lack of loss aversion is somewhat robust in this
context. Another interesting factor is the impact of feedback. Studies on my-
opic loss aversion show that reluctance to take risks involving possible losses
might be strengthened if information about winning or losing is instantly
provided. While this poses a technical diﬃculty within the framework pro-
posed in this study, the impact of feedback frequency will be investigated in
a follow-up project.
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